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GUARANTORS AS DEBTORS UNDER UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-501(3)
INTRODUCTION

Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or the
"Code")1 requires a secured party to notify the debtor 2 before disposing
of collateral in satisfaction of an unpaid debt or obligation. The drafters
of the Code considered the reasons for requiring the secured party to
notify the debtor of the impending sale of the collateral to be of such
importance that they disregarded freedom of contract principles3 to state
in section 9-501(3) that the notice requirement cannot be waived or varied by agreement prior to default.4
Although section 9-504(3) speaks only of debtors,5 it is well established that guarantors are considered debtors under this section.6 Courts
disagree, however, whether a guarantor is considered a debtor under section 9-501(3) and, as such, cannot waive prior to default his right to notice of the sale of collateral.'
1. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978). Section 9-504(3) states:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the
time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after
which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent
by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement
renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale.
IdL
2. Section 9-105(l)(d) of the Code defines a debtor as anyone who "owes payment or
other performance of the obligation secured." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d) (1978). In situations
where the collateral is owned by a third party, however, the term debtor includes both the
owner of the collateral and the person who is obligated on the debt or the performance.
Id
3. The Code generally favors freedom of contract principles, see U.C.C. § 1-102(3)
& official comment 2 (1978), subject to specific exceptions of varying degrees of explicitness contained within the Code. Id The exception found in § 9-501(3), however, is
"quite explicit." U.C.C. § 1-102 official comment 2 (1978).
4. Section 9-501(3) states:
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated in [subsection (3) of 9-504] may not be waived or
varied... but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the fulfillment of these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are
not manifestly unreasonable ....
U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1978).
5. See supra note 1.
6. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
7. Compare, e.g., United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 257-58 (6th Cir. 1979) (guarantors permitted to raise § 9-504(3) defenses under Ohio Code despite any waiver in
guaranty agreement) and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1004
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (guarantor is a debtor within the meaning of Article 9 and as such is
afforded the nonwaiver protection of § 9-501(3)) with United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 846 (10th Cir. 1986) (in the guaranty agreement, guarantor
can waive right to notice of sale of collateral under New Mexico U.C.C.) and First Nat'l
Park Bank v. Johnson, 553 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1977) (guarantors not debtors under
Montana U.C.C. § 9-501(3)); see also infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Note discusses the elements of a secured transaction, the
guarantor's role therein and the importance of the notice requirement.
Part II argues that entitling guarantors to the nonwaiver protection of
section 9-501(3) best serves the purposes of Article 9 of the U.C.C. and
the basic principles of equity and fairness.
I.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

A.

The Guarantor'sRole

Article 9 governs secured transactions,8 which are transactions that
create a security interest. 9 A security interest arises when the parties to a
commercial transaction enter into an agreement that provides the seller
or lender ' ° with an interest in described property to ensure payment or
performance of an obligation.'"
Although most secured parties contemplate that the debtor will fulfill
his obligations under the security agreement, secured transactions exist
to cover those instances when the debtor fails to meet his obligation. The
underlying rationale of the secured transaction lies in the secured party's
rights in the collateral 2 after the debtor has defaulted.' 3 Following de8. See U.C.C. § 9-101 & official comment (1978); 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in
Personal Property § 10.1, at 296 (1965).
9. The U.C.C. defines a security interest as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(1978). Creation of an enforceable security interest requires three elements: a security
agreement that contains a description of the collateral and is signed by the debtor, unless
the debtor has given the secured party possession of the property; the giving of value by
the secured party; and the existence of the debtor's rights in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9203(1) (1978).
10. The U.C.C. calls such a party a "secured party." (defining "secured party" as "a
lender, seller or other person in whose favor there is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts or chattel paper have been sold," U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(m) (1978)).
11. See U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(1) (1978); R. Henson, Secured Transactions § 3-51, at 41
(1979). The purpose of a security agreement is to confirm the contract that the parties
have made. See R. Henson, supra, § 3-10, at 40. While the security agreement generally
will be valid as to its terms between the parties and against third parties, § 9-201 provides
two exceptions. See U.C.C. § 9-201 (1978). A provision in the security agreement that
conflicts with a specific provision in the Code that cannot be waived or varied by agreement or is illegal under the terms of another statute is unenforceable. U.C.C. § 9-201
official comment (1978); see also R. Henson, supra, § 3-6, at 34 (citing U.C.C. § 9-501(3)
as an example of Code provision that cannot be changed by a security agreement).
12. U.C.C. § 9-501 official comment 1 (1978) ("The rights of the secured party in the
collateral after the debtor's default are of the essence of a security transaction."). "Collateral" is a general term for tangible and intangible property subject to a security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c) & official comment 3 (1978).
13. The U.C.C. does not actually define the term "default." The Code allows the
parties to determine what constitutes default in the security agreement. See U.C.C. § 9501(1) (1978); R. Duncan & W. Lyons, The Law of Practice of Secured Transactions:
Working with Article 9, § 5.01, at 5-3 (1987); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 43.3, at 1193;
R. Henson, supra note 11, § 10-2, at 350. Default generally occurs when a debtor fails to
pay the debt or perform the obligation in accordance with the terms agreed upon in the
security agreement. See R. Duncan & W. Lyons, supra, § 5.01, at 5-3; 2 G. Gilmore,
supra note 8, § 43.3, at 1193; R. Henson, supra note 11, § 10-2, at 350; T. Quinn, Uni-
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fault, the secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral,
unless he already has it in pledge. 4 The secured party then can sell the
collateral in order to liquidate the debt' 5 and can seek a deficiency judgment against the debtor if the value received for the collateral falls short
of the secured obligation. 6
Although the secured party possesses these rights in the collateral, as
well as the option of pursuing the debtor, 7 frequently he desires some
further assurance that the debt will be paid. Thus, in many secured
transactions the secured party requires the debtor to obtain a guarantor."8 The guarantor promises to become secondarily liable for payment
of the debt or for performance of the obligation in the event the debtor
defaults. 9 The guarantor also agrees to be held liable for any deficiency
judgment.20
Guarantors resemble debtors, then, in that a guarantor, upon default
by the primary debtor, owes payment on an obligation secured. 2' The
Code does not specifically address guarantors in Article 9, however, and
it is unclear whether a guarantor falls within the meaning of "debtor"
every time the word appears in Article 9 of the U.C.C.22 Consequently,
form Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 9-501[A][1 1], at s9-486 (Cumm.
Supp. No. 2 1987).
14. U.C.C. § 9-503 & official comment (1978).
15. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) states that after default the secured party may "sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the collateral." U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1978); see also I_Duncan & W.
Lyons, supra note 13, § 5.02[2], at 5-11 (discussing the remedies under Article 9). The
only restriction the Code places on the secured party is that the method of disposition be
"commercially reasonable." See U.C.C. § 9-504(1) & official comment 1 (1978).
Although the Code specifies that certain methods of disposition are considered "commercially reasonable" (sale of collateral to or through a dealer or in recognized market), the
term is otherwise undefined by the Code. See U.C.C. § 9-507 & official comment 2
(1978); R. Duncan & W. Lyons, supra note 13, § 5.04[3], at 5-28 to 5-33 (discussing
commercial reasonableness).
16. See U.C.C. § 9-504 official comment 3 (1978).
17. See U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1978) (granting the secured party upon default the right to
"reduce his claim to judgment").
18. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp 996, 997 (E.D. Pa.
1982); Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1121, 229 Cal. Rptr.
396, 397 (1986); Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 275, 496
N.E.2d 625, 626 (1986).
19. See Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. at 998; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp.
1326, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1979); First Nat'l Bank v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1980); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984); Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 278, 496 N.E.2d 625,
628 (1986); J. Elder, The Law of Suretyship § 4.1, at 58 (5th ed. 1951).
20. See supra note 19.

21. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1002-03 (E.D. Pa.
1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo.Ct. App. 1980); McEntire
v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind.Ct. App. 1984); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772, 779 (N.D. 1980).
22. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 86, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 410 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977).
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the courts decide whether the term "debtor" includes guarantors on a
section-by-section basis.2 3 A rational connection between the various
findings of the courts, however, does not always exist.
B. Importance of the Notice Requirement
The U.C.C. recognizes and is wary of the great potential for overreaching on the part of creditors that exists in default situations.2 4 Comment 4 to section 9-501(3) states that in default situations, agreements

made by creditors limiting debtors' rights must be viewed with suspicion. 5 Commentators also have recognized creditors' tendency to overreach when default occurs.2 6
Consequently, section 9-504(3) states that a debtor, upon default, has a
right to notice of the sale of the collateral by the secured party. 7 The
purpose of requiring such notice is to give the debtor a chance to protect
his interest in the property.2 8 He can protect himself by paying the debt
and redeeming the property, by challenging any aspect of the sale before
it is made, or by finding a third party who may be interested in purchasing the property.2 9 The ultimate goal of section 9-504(3) is to promote
economic efficiency by giving the debtor an opportunity to maximize the
23. See infra note 68.
24. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1000-01 (E.D. Pa.
1982); U.C.C. § 9-501 official comment 4 (1978).
25. Comment 4 states:
In general, provisions which relate to matters which come up between immediate parties may be varied by agreement. In the area of rights after default our
legal system has traditionally looked with suspicion on agreements designed to
cut down the debtor's rights and free the secured party of his duties .... The
default situation offers great scope for overreaching; the suspicious attitude of
the courts has been grounded in common sense.
U.C.C. § 9-501 official comment 4 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Sachs & Belgrad, Liability of the Guarantor of Secured Indebtedness
After Default and Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Walk on the
Wild Side by the Secured Party, 5 U. Balt. L. Rev. 153, 159-63 (1976); Note, Commercial
Law-Commercially UnreasonableForeclosureSales in the Context of a Surety Relation.
ship-United States v. Lattauzio, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 175, 189 (1985).
27. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
28. U.C.C. § 9-504 official comment 5 requires that notice be sent such that "persons
entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to take appropriate steps to protect their
interests by taking part in the sale or other disposition if they so desire." U.C.C. § 9-504
official comment 5 (1978); see Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d
1119, 1124, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cillessen, 622
P.2d 598, 600-01 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338
N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn. 1983); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 90,
401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 44.6, at 1241.
29. See Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1124, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 396, 399 (1986); Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 3d 965, 972, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 381, 384-85 (1985); First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 600-01
(Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 254 Ga. 615, 621, 331 S.E.2d 589,
595 (1985); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn.
1983); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 90, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 412
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
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sale price of the collateral and thus minimize or eliminate any potential
deficiency for which he may be liable."0
As previously stated, a guarantor may become liable for any deficiency
upon default by the primary debtor.3 Depending upon the guaranty
agreement, the secured creditor may be able to obtain any deficiency
amount directly from the guarantor.32 As a result, the guarantor has as
much of an interest in protecting his rights during the sale of collateral as
does the primary debtor. 3
Recognizing the interests of the guarantor, courts hold that guarantors
are entitled to receive notice of the sale of the collateral by the secured
party under section 9-504(3).34 Courts disagree, however, whether guarantors may invoke the protections of the nonwaiver provision of U.C.C.
section 9-501(3). 31 This issue arises frequently because guaranty agree30. See R. Duncan & W. Lyons, supra note 13, § 5.01, at 5-3; Sachs & Belgrad, supra
note 26, at 159; supra note 29; see also T. Quinn, supra note 13, 9-501[A][9], at s9-485
(notice "designed to make sure [debtor] gets a fair deal on the resale").
31. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
32. The guaranty agreement generally states whether the secured party must first attempt to pursue the primary debtor before obtaining any deficiency from the guarantor.
T. Quinn, supra note 13, 9-501[A][13], at s9-488.
33. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1979);
Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1124, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396,
399 (1986); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn.
1983); R. Duncan & W. Lyons, supra note 13, § 5.04[2], at 5-27.
34. See United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir.
1986) (New Mexico Code); United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 594 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Indiana Code); First Nat'l Park Bank v. Johnson, 553 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Montana Code); United States v. Kurtz, 525 F. Supp. 734, 745 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (California Code), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); National
Acceptance Co. v. Wechsler, 489 F. Supp. 642, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Illinois U.C.C.);
Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 145, 398 S.W.2d 538, 540 (1966);
Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1125, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396,
400, (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 600-01 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1980); Barnett Bank of Tallahassee v. Campbell, 402 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 254 Ga. 615, 621-22, 331 S.E.2d 589, 595
(1985); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984);
Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 278-79, 496 N.E.2d 625, 628
(1986); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn. 1983);
Clune Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Spanglar, 615 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Watton, 215 Neb. 318, 323, 338 N.W.2d 612, 615-16
(1983); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 90-91, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404,
412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Hernandez v. Bexar County Nat'l Bank of San Antonio, 710
S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
35. CompareUnited States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 254-58 (6th Cir. 1979) (guarantors
permitted to raise § 9-504(3) defenses under Ohio Code despite any waiver in guaranty
agreement) and United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 949, 952-53 (8th Cir.
1978) (waiver of rights in a guaranty agreement restricted by § 9-501(3) of the North
Dakota Code) and Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (guarantor is a debtor within the meaning of Article 9; nonwaiver protection of
§ 9-501(3) applies) and Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (M.D.
Fla. 1979) (waiver of right to notice by the guarantor in guaranty agreement ineffective)
and Prescott v. Thompson Tractor Co., 495 So. 2d 513, 517 (Ala. 1986) (same) and
Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1125, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396,
400 (1986) (same) and First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 600-01
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ments generally contain a provision that waives the right to notice of the
sale of collateral. 36 If a guarantor is considered a debtor under section 9501(3), the waiver in the guaranty agreement conflicts with section 9-

501(3) of the Code because the guaranty agreement is signed prior to

default.3 7 In view of the significance the Code assigns to the requirement
that the secured party notify the guarantor, 8 the nonwaiver provision in
the Code should invalidate any waiver of the right to notice of the sale of
the collateral in a guaranty agreement. Invalidation of the waiver furthers the Code's purpose of promoting economic efficiency and uniformity, given that the guarantor has as much of an interest in the value of the
collateral as does the debtor.
(Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (guarantor is a debtor under Article 9 of U.C.C. and is "entitled to
the same defenses as the [owner] of the collateral.") and Barnett Bank of Tallahassee v.
Campbell, 402 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (guarantor cannot waive right to
notice of sale of collateral in guaranty agreement) and Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So. 2d 804, 805-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (same) and Branan v. Equico
Lessors, Inc., 255 Ga. 718, 722, 342 S.E.2d 671, 674 (1986) (guarantor is a debtor under
§ 9-501(3); predefault waiver of § 9-504(3) rights invalid) and McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l
Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1224-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (guarantor cannot waive right to
notice of sale of collateral prior to default) and Shawmut Worcester County Bank v.
Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 279-80, 496 N.E.2d 625, 629-30 (1986) (§ 9-501(3) precludes guarantor from waiving rights afforded him as a debtor under § 9-504(3)) and Chemlease
Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn. 1983) (guarantor's waiver of
right to notice invalid under U.C.C.) and Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Watton, 215
Neb. 318, 324, 338 N.W.2d 612, 615-16 (1983) (guarantor a debtor under Article 9 of
U.C.C. and cannot waive right to notice of sale of collateral prior to default) and Hernandez v. Bexar County Nat'l Bank of San Antonio, 710 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986) (same) and Peck v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 704 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(per curiam) (guarantors covered by term "debtor" under § 9-501(3)) with United States
v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 846 (10th Cir. 1986) (guarantor can
waive right to notice of sale of collateral in guaranty agreement under New Mexico's
U.C.C.) and United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 594 (7th Cir. 1985) (Indiana Code
does not prohibit guarantor from waiving right to notice in guaranty agreement) and
United States v. Lattauzio, 748 F.2d 559, 562-63 (10th Cir. 1984) (guarantors can waive
defenses afforded them under New Mexico's U.C.C. § 9-504(3)) and United States v.
Kukowski, 735 F.2d 1057, 1059 (8th Cir. 1984) (North Dakota's U.C.C. allows guarantor to waive right to notice in the guaranty agreement) and First Nat'l Park Bank v.
Johnson, 553 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1977) (guarantors not debtors under Montana's
U.C.C. § 9-501(3)) and United States v. Crispen, 622 F. Supp. 75, 79, 81 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(Illinois U.C.C. does not prohibit guarantor from waiving right to notice prior to default)
and National Acceptance Co. v. Wechsler, 489 F. Supp. 642, 647-49 (N.D. I11. 1980)
(§ 9-501(3) does not invalidate guarantor's waiver of right to notice in the guaranty
agreement) and United States v. Kurtz, 525 F. Supp. 734, 746 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (guarantors can waive protections afforded them under California U.C.C.), aff'd mem., 688 F.
2d. 827 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982) and Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc., 173
Cal. App. 3d 965, 973, 219 Cal. Rptr. 381, 385-86 (1985) (guarantor's waiver valid).
36. See Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1125, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 396, 397, 400, (1986); Barnett Bank of Tallahassee v. Campbell, 402 So. 2d 12, 14
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428,
433 (Minn. 1983); T. Quinn, supra note 13, 1 9-501[A][10], at s9-485.
37. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1978).
38. See supra notes 3, 4, 30 and accompanying text.
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II.

THE GUARANTOR AS DEBTOR UNDER U.C.C. SECTION

A.

9-501(3)

Guarantor'sInterest in the Property's Value
is Equal to that of the Debtor

A guarantor should not be able to waive his right to notice prior to
default for the same reason he was afforded it in the first place: to pro-

tect his interest in the collateral by reducing any deficiency for which he
may be liable.39 In NationalAcceptance Co. v. Wechsler,40 the court con-

cluded that debtors, as owners of the collateral, have a greater interest in
the collateral than guarantors."

Therefore, it held that the waiver of the

right to notice in the guaranty agreement was valid. 2 This argument,
however, fails to recognize that the guarantor possesses as much of an
interest in the collateral as the primary debtor because both the debtor
and the guarantor may be liable for any deficiency.43 Therefore,
although the debtor, if he is the owner of the collateral, may have a
greater interest in the actual property, the guarantor has an equal interest
in the property's value.

In addition, requiring the creditor to notify the guarantor of the sale of
the collateral neither burdens nor prejudices him in any way because the

creditor already knows the identity of the guarantor.'

Moreover, if the

secured party readily can contact the guarantor when it is time to collect

the deficiency, then no valid reason can exist for not contacting him to
notify him of the sale of the collateral.
B. Nonwaiver Promotes Economic Efficiency
Allowing a guarantor to waive his right to notice of the sale of collateral in the guaranty agreement also runs contrary to the Code's purpose
of promoting economic efficiency.4" In fact, such a rule actually spurs
39. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1979);
Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1124, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396,
399 (1986); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn. 1983).
40. 489 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Ill. 1980), not followed in Commercial Discount Corp. v.
King, 515 F. Supp. 988, 991-92 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
41. 489 F. Supp. at 647-48.
42. Id.
43. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Connolly v.
Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1124, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (1986);
First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980);
Hepworth v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 323 So. 2d 41, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 278-79, 496 N.E.2d 625, 62829 (1986); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 NW.2d 428, 433 (Minn. 1983);
Googins, CommercialLaw, 1981 Ann. Surv. of Am. L. 721, 736 n.106 (1981); Sachs &
Belgrad, supra note 26, at 161; Note, supra note 26, at 189.
44. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 90, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404,
412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (citing Sachs & Belgrad, supra note 26, at 165-66).
45. The basic policy behind requiring the secured party to notify the debtor prior to
the sale of the collateral is to promote economic efficiency. See United States v. Willis,
593 F.2d 247, 258 (6th Cir. 1979); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996,
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economic inefficiency because it encourages secured parties to hold

"sloppy" sales, knowing that they can demand payment of any deficiency
from the guarantor.46
The Code's requirement that a sale of collateral be "commercially reasonable" does not guarantee that the price obtained will be the highest
possible price.47 When secured transactions do not include a guarantor,
the secured party has an incentive to sell the collateral at the highest
possible price because the proceeds from the sale are likely to be all that

he will recover in the event of default. 48 The debtor, although liable for

any deficiency, probably will not be able to pay given that he already has
defaulted on the original debt.49 If the transaction involves a guarantor,
however, the secured party's incentive to sell the collateral at the highest
price possible no longer exists because the guarantor is available to pay
any deficiency judgment.5 0 Accordingly, secured creditors should not be
allowed to circumvent the Code's purpose of maximizing efficiency "by
the simple expedient of requiring a debtor to obtain a guarantor." 5 1
One commentator has questioned 52 whether guarantors were intended
to receive the nonwaiver protection of section 9-501(3), because comment
4 of 9-501(3) is tied to common law equity of redemption principles that
provide the owner of the collateral the right to redeem the property after
default.5 3 This argument fails to recognize, however, that the nonwaiver
provision primarily attempts to promote economic efficiency 54 by provid1003-04 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 44.5, at 1234 (1965)
(discussing importance of getting highest price for collateral).
46. See B. Clark, Law of Secured Transactions § 12.5[7][c], at s12-24 (Cumm. Supp.
No. 3 1987).
47. See U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1978) ("The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner."); R. Duncan & W. Lyons, supra note 13, § 5.04[3][d], at
5-33 (inadequacy of the selling price obtained by the secured party not enough to make
the sale unreasonable); see also 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 8, § 44.6, at 1237 (quoting
U.C.C. § 9-507(2)); R. Henson, supra note 11, § 10-10, at 368 (standard of commercial
reasonableness varies depending on type of collateral and circumstances).
48. R. Henson, supra note 11, § 10-10, at 367-68 ("A deficiency may be the debtor's
responsiblity, but it is likely to be uncollectible.").
49. Id.
50. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
51. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see
B. Clark, supra note 46, § 12.5[7][c], at s12-24.
52. See Note, The Waiver of Defenses by Guarantorsin Guaranty Contracts and the
Nonwaiver Provisionsof the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 Vt. L. Rev. 73, 92 (1980) ("The
interests of a guarantor do not share the same historic concerns that have protected debtors from creditors.").
53. Section 9-506 provides that the debtor has an opportunity to redeem the property
by paying the debt or fulfilling the obligation before the secured party sells the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-506 (1978).
54. See United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 258 (6th Cir. 1979); Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also 2 G. Gilmore, supra
note 8, § 44.2, at 1216 ("The principal thing is that the debtor be credited with the value
of the property against the debt.").
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ing the "debtor," even if he does not own the collateral, with a right to
notice of the sale of the collateral that may not be waived prior to default. 5 Notice provides the "debtor" with an opportunity to assure that
the collateral is sold at the highest price possible. 6 Since guarantors may
be liable for any deficiency, providing them with the same notice equally
will insure that the price is maximized, thereby achieving the Code's goal
of efficient use of resources.5 7 To do otherwise would be to encourage
economic waste.5 8
Moreover, denying the guarantor the protections of the Code's nonwaiver provisions promotes formalism over functionalism.5 9 In McEntire v. Indiana National Bank," the court held that the guarantor's
waiver of his right to notice of the sale of collateral in the guaranty agree-

ment was invalid.6 The court emphasized that a decision to uphold the
waiver would "hinge upon semantics rather then actualities."62 Similarly, commentators have observed that it would be "arbitrary" and "capricious" to include in the definition of "debtor" the third-party owner of
the collateral who is willing to make his property available as security
but who is not liable for any deficiency but then to exclude the guarantor
who may be accountable for the entire deficiency.63

55. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1978).
56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
57. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
("At the very least, notice of an impending sale would have provided defendants the
opportunity to assure that the price obtained for the [collateral] was the best price possible."); Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1124, 229 Cal. Rptr.
396, 399 (1986) ("[A] guarantor has as much interest in protecting his rights during the
sale or disposition of the collateral as does the primary debtor and therefore is equally
entitled to notice;" the purpose of notice is to allow him to reduce any potential liability
resulting from the sale); First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 600-01
(Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (notice provision should be construed to include guarantors in
order to minimize any deficiency resulting from sale of the collateral); Chemlease Worldwide Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn. 1983) ("The interest [the guarantors] have in the best sale price is their interest in their potential liability on the
guaranty."); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) ("When the probability of deficiency looms after default, the guarantor is the
real target of the secured party.").
58. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. at 1004.
59. The official comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 provides that the Code should make distinctions along functional rather than formal lines. U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment
(1978); see Prescott v. Thompson Tractor Co., 495 So. 2d 513, 517 (Ala. 1986); McEntire
v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 88, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
60. 471 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
61. Id. at 1224.
62. Id.; see also Prescott v. Thompson Tractor Co., 495 So. 2d 513, 517 (Ala. 1986)
(quoting McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984));
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Natarelli, 93 Misc. 2d 78, 88, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 411 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977) ("[I]n view of the code's 'scheme ... to make distinctions ... along
functional rather than formal lines' . . , it would seem that a 'guarantor' is a 'debtor'
within the meaning of article 9." (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 9-101 (Mckinney's 1981)).
63. Sachs & Belgrad, supra note 26, at 161.
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C. Nonwaiver Promotes Uniformity

Allowing the guarantor the protections of U.C.C. section 9-501(3) also
promotes uniformity within the Code.' The U.C.C. would be arbitrary
if the various definitions within Article 9 were not uniform. It is well
established that a guarantor falls within the definition of a debtor under
section 9-105(1)(d).6 1 It is also well established that guarantors are considered to be within the meaning of "debtor" under section 9-504(3),66
which requires the secured party to notify the debtor of the sale of the
collateral. 67 From the conclusion that a guarantor is a debtor under both

sections, 9-501(1)(d) and 9-504(3), it follows that a guarantor also should
be considered a debtor for purposes of section 9-501(3),68 especially in
light of the significance that the drafters of the Code, the courts, and
commentators place on the notice requirement in general.69
64. See infra note 68. The Code places great importance on having a uniform commercial law among jurisdictions. See Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. Miller, 398
Mass. 273, 278-79, 496 N.E.2d 625, 628-29 (1986) (better course is to follow majority
view); Peck v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 704 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam)
(it is well-settled law that guarantors are debtors under § 9-504; it would be illogical not
to include them under § 9-501(3)). Section 1-102(2)(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code
states that one of the underlying purposes of the Code is to make the law among various
jurisdictions uniform. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1978); see Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma
County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1125, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396, 400 (1986). Clear definitions
within the Code will promote uniform Code interpretations among the various
jurisdictions.
65. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lototsky, 549 F. Supp. 996, 1004-05 (E.D. Pa.
1982); National Acceptance Co. v. Wechsler, 489 F. Supp. 642, 647 (N.D. I11.1980);
Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1125, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396,
400 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo. Ct. App.
1980); Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 254 Ga. 615, 622, 331 S.E.2d 589, 595 (1985); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Shawmut
Worcester County Bank v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 278, 496 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1986); BorgWarner Acceptance Corp. v. Watton, 215 Neb. 318, 324, 338 N.W.2d 612, 615 (1983);
State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772,
779 (N.D. 1980); First Bank & Trust Co. of Ithaca v. Mitchell, 123 Misc. 2d 386, 389,
473 N.Y.S.2d 697, 700 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Natarelli, 93
Misc. 2d 78, 89, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
66. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
67. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978).
68. See McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1223-24 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984); Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 279, 496 N.E.2d 625,
629 (1986); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289
N.W.2d 772, 779 (N.D. 1980); Peck v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 704 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (per curiam); see also First Bank & Trust Co. of Ithaca v. Mitchell, 123 Misc.
2d 386, 389, 473 N.Y.S.2d 697, 700 (1984) (court stated in dictum that since a guarantor
is a debtor under § 9-105(1)(d) and § 9-504(3), it is likely that a guarantor would be a
debtor under § 9-501(3)). But see First Nat'l Park Bank v. Johnson, 553 F.2d 599, 602
(9th Cir. 1977) (although guarantor is entitled to notice as a "debtor" under § 9-504(3),
policies of U.C.C. notice provision do not prohibit by implication a guarantor from waiving right to notice prior to default); National Acceptance Co. v. Wechsler, 489 F. Supp.
642, 647-48 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (guarantor's status as a debtor under § 9-504(3) does not
mandate that guarantor cannot waive rights accorded thereunder).
69. See supra notes 3, 4, 30 and accompanying text.
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Some courts have based their decisions to uphold waivers in guaranty
agreements on the fact that to do otherwise would infringe on the parties'
right to contract freely.70 Although the guaranty agreement contains a

waiver of the right to notice of the sale of the collateral, and the guarantor, by signing the agreement, voluntarily waives this protection, the

waiver nevertheless should be invalidated by section 9-501(3). The drafters of the Code considered the notice requirement essential enough to the

Code's purposes to make it explicitly nonwaivable. 7 t Under section 9501(3), a debtor cannot validly waive his right to notice of the sale of the

collateral prior to default, even if he receives valuable consideration in
exchange for the waiver.72 Therefore, neither should a secured party be
allowed to evade the purpose of the Code by contract
when the language
73
of the section clearly prohibits such a waiver.

D. The Identity of the Secured Party Should be Irrelevantfor
Purposes of Nonwaiver

Many of the decisions that have allowed a guarantor to waive his right
to notice of the sale of collateral in the guaranty agreement have involved

the Small Business Administration ("SBA")7 4 and, as such, appear to be
giving the government special treatment by not affording the guarantors
the protections normally provided by section 9-501(3)." Because they
upheld the waivers in the SBA guaranty agreements, the courts in these
cases held guarantors liable for the deficiency resulting from the sales of
the collateral even though they had not received notice of them.7 6 If

these guarantors had been considered debtors under section 9-501(3) of
the Code, the waivers of the right to notice would have been unenforcable 77 and, because the SBA did not give the guarantors the opportunity

to monitor the sales, they most likely would not have been liable for any
deficiency judgment.7 8
70. See United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 594-98 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing
contract theories); United States v. Crispen, 622 F. Supp. 75, 78 (N.D. Il1. 1985) ("plain
language of the guaranty controls").
71. U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1978); see supra note 3.
72. See U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1978).
73. See supra note 3. One commentator has called decisions allowing a guarantor to
waive in the guaranty agreement the right to notice of the sale of collateral prior to
default "masterpiece[s] of statutory destruction." B. Clark, supra note 46, f 12.5[7][c], at
s12-22.
74. See United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 591 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Kukowski, 735 F.2d 1057, 1057 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kurtz, 525 F. Supp.
734, 736 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 827 (3d. Cir.), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 991
(1982); United States v. Lattauzio, 748 F.2d 559, 560 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Crispen, 622 F. Supp. 75, 76 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
75. See B. Clark, supra note 46, 12.5[7][c], at s12-25.
76. See supra note 74.
77. See U.C.C § 9-501(3)(b) (1978).
78. The Code does not address the relationship between the debtor's liability for a
deficiency and the secured party's noncompliance with the required default procedures of
Article 9. See R. Duncan & W. Lyons, supra note 13, § 5.08[3], at 5-62; 1 G. Gilmore,
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The decisions affording the government special treatment fail to recognize that "the United States does business on business terms." 79 In
United States v. Kimbell Foods,8" the Supreme Court stated that "federal
law governs questions involving the rights of the United States arising
under nationwide federal programs."'" The Court stated, however, that
in cases where the state law is derived from a uniform statute, the federal
law should look to the applicable state statute.8 2 Despite the Supreme
Court's holding in Kimbell Foods, the government has tried to avoid the
application of state law in cases involving the SBA.83 It is clear, howsupra note 8, § 44.9, at 1263-64. Professor Gilmore, however, states "the secured party's
compliance with the default provisions in Part 5 . . . is a condition precedent to the
recovery of a deficiency." Id. at 1264.
The majority of courts that have decided this issue have agreed with Professor Gilmore
and have held that the failure to comply with Part 5 of Article 9 results in an absolute bar
to recovery of any deficiency. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp.
1326, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal. App. 3d
1119, 1125, 229 Cal. Rptr. 396, 400 (Cal Ct. App. 1986); Barnett Bank of Tallahassee v.
Campbell, 402 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 254
Ga. 615, 619-21, 331 S.E.2d 589, 593, 596-97 (1985); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v.
Watton, 215 Neb. 318, 323, 338 N.W.2d 612, 615 (1983); DeLay First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 409, 243 N.W.2d 745, 751 (1976);
Hernandez v. Bexar County Nat'l Bank of San Antonio, 710 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986); Peck v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 704 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (per
curiam).
Other courts have held that the failure to comply with Part 5 of Article 9 does not
automatically preclude the secured party from recovering a deficiency, but it does give
rise to a rebuttable presumption in the debtor's favor that the value of the collateral is
equal to the amount of the debt. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 259-60
(6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Chatlin's Dep't Store, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 108, 112 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Cillessen, 622 P.2d 598, 601 (Colo. Ct. App.
1980); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984);
State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772,
779-80 (N.D. 1980).
A few courts have allowed the secured party to collect a deficiency judgment from the
debtor but have allowed the debtor to offset the deficiency with any loss resulting from
the secured party's failure to adhere to Part 5 of Article 9. See Shawmut Worcester
County Bank v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 282-83, 496 N.E.2d 625, 631 (1986); Grant
County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 869, 496 P.2d 966, 969 (1972).
79. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) (quoting United
States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926)). In Clearfield
Trust, the issue was whether the general rules governing the rights and duties of drawees
were inapplicable to the government. Id.
80. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
81. Id. at 726.
82. See id. at 728-29; see, e.g., United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785
F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying New Mexico U.C.C.); United States v. Meadors,
753 F.2d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying Indiana's U.C.C.); United States v. Lattauzio, 748 F.2d 559, 561-62 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying New Mexico's U.C.C.); United
States v. Kukowski, 735 F.2d 1057, 1059 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying North Dakota's
U.C.C.); United States v. Kurtz, 525 F. Supp. 734, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (applying California's U.C.C.), aff'd mem., 688 F. 2d 827 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 1985) (government relied on federal case law); Kurtz, 525 F. Supp. at 744-46 (government argued that
state law was inapplicable).
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ever, that these arguments should be dismissed given the Supreme
Court's holding in Kimbell Foods."
In addition, the Sixth Circuit 5 stated that the adoption of state law in
situations involving secured creditors does not prejudice the government,
and no good reasons exist to allow the government, simply because it is
the government, to depart from the U.C.C.86 Commentators also fail to
find any reasons for treating the government differently. 7 Accordingly,
the fact that the government is the secured party in a case should be
irrelevant to the determination of whether a guarantor is a debtor under
the U.C.C.
CONCLUSION

The U.C.C. recognizes the potential for overreaching on the part of
creditors in the default situation and therefore requires that when a default occurs, the secured party notify the debtor before the sale of collateral in order to protect the debtor from unnecessary loss. This protection is so important that section 9-501(3) in contravention of the usual
Code policy upholding freedom of contract principles provides that it is
nonwaivable prior to default.
Since guarantors possess as much of an interest in the collateral as do
the primary debtors, they are considered debtors for purposes of receiving notice of the sale of collateral from the secured party. Accordingly,
the purposes of Article 9, as well as the basic principles of equity and
fairness, are best served by further entitling guarantors the nonwaiver
protection of section 9-501(3).
Beth C. Housman
84. United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 733-37 (1979). In Kimbell Foods,
the government argued that uniform federal rules are needed for effective administration
of federal loan programs. 1d. at 729. The Court stated, however, that incorporating state
law as the applicable federal law to determine the rights of the government against private creditors would not hinder the administration of the SBA loan program. Id. at 72930; see also, B. Clark, supra note 46, 12.5[7][c], at s12-25 (discussing Kimbell Foods).
85. United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979).
86. Id at 252-54 (discussing whether federal government should be excepted from
U.C.C. standard of commercial reasonableness and requirement that secured party notify
debtor prior to sale of collateral).
87. See B. Clark, supra note 46, 12.5[7][c], at s12-25; Googins, supra note 43, at 739
n. 122.

